Saks x Amazon Is Over — And It Exposes the Structural Crisis of Luxury Retail

Two weeks after my analysis of luxury retail at a crossroads, the “Saks on Amazon” experiment is being wound down. The outcome isn’t just a setback for one partnership — it’s a signal about what’s breaking (and what must change) in luxury retail’s operating model.

Related (published Jan 5, 2026): Luxury retail in the U.S. at a crossroads — beyond the Saks Global crisis

What happened: a partnership that never achieved escape velocity

The “Saks on Amazon” storefront was supposed to be a proof point: a premium department-store curator leveraging a digital giant’s reach, logistics, and personalization engine to accelerate luxury e-commerce adoption. Instead, it became a case study in how difficult luxury is to scale on a generalist marketplace.

According to reporting shared with employees, the storefront saw limited participation from brands and failed to deliver the traction needed to justify the operational and reputational complexity. The parent company is now winding down the storefront to refocus attention on its own channels — in plain terms, to drive traffic back to its own ecosystem and concentrate scarce executive bandwidth where it matters most.

Context matters: the wind-down comes as the company is restructuring, trimming non-core operations, and rethinking how much complexity it can carry while it stabilizes vendor relationships, cash flow, and customer demand.

This isn’t a “digital is dead” story. It’s a “luxury distribution is a governance problem” story — and the partnership made that governance problem visible.

Why this matters beyond the headline

Luxury retail has always balanced two competing imperatives:

Growth (new customers, new categories, new geographies, more transactions)
Control (brand narrative, scarcity, pricing integrity, service choreography)

In strong cycles, luxury can “have both” — because demand is robust enough to tolerate distribution imperfections. In weak or volatile cycles, the trade-off becomes brutal: every additional channel adds operational cost, increases pricing pressure, expands return rates, and weakens the brand’s ability to create a coherent client experience.

The end of this partnership is a symptom of that broader reality: luxury retail is recalibrating from expansion to consolidation — pruning channels that dilute unit economics or brand equity, especially when liquidity is tight and vendor confidence is fragile.

The “Amazon + luxury” paradox: scale vs. scarcity

Amazon’s value proposition is built on convenience, breadth, price transparency, and frictionless fulfillment. Luxury’s value proposition is built on the opposite: controlled distribution, brand theater, scarcity cues, and a service model that makes the customer feel known.

That doesn’t mean luxury can’t sell online — it obviously can. It means luxury online requires a different operating system:

1) Brand governance is the product

In luxury, the “store” isn’t just a shelf; it’s a stage. The visual hierarchy, editorial tone, packaging, authentication assurances, and the post-purchase relationship are part of what the customer is buying. Marketplaces struggle here because:

They optimize for conversion efficiency, not brand choreography.
They compress brands into a standardized interface (which is exactly what luxury brands resist).
They introduce adjacency risk: premium items appear one scroll away from mass-market products.

2) Scarcity and discount discipline are strategic assets

Luxury brands obsess over controlling discounting, third-party resellers, and grey-market leakage. In a marketplace environment, even if the luxury storefront is curated, the broader platform trains customers to compare, hunt, and wait for deals.

That creates a structural tension: luxury wants “confidence,” marketplaces create “optionalities.”

3) Trust is fragile — and it’s everything

For luxury buyers, trust is not just “will it arrive?” It’s:

Is it authentic?
Is it handled properly?
Will the return/refund experience be premium?
Will I be treated like a client, not an order number?

Amazon has invested heavily in trust mechanisms across categories, but luxury has an unusually high “trust bar.” Even one reputational scare can have a disproportionate impact on brand participation.

4) Luxury needs data ownership, not just data access

Luxury has shifted from transactions to relationships. The growth flywheel depends on building a client book: preferences, events, service history, and high-touch outreach. When luxury sells through a third-party, it risks becoming a “supplier” instead of a “relationship owner.”

This is why many luxury brands favor models that preserve identity and customer ownership: controlled wholesale, concessions, and first-party e-commerce — even if reach is smaller.

Saks’ real priority: rebuild the core, protect liquidity, restore partner trust

Partnerships are rarely wound down because leadership suddenly “stops believing” in the idea. They’re wound down because trade-offs become impossible to justify under constraint.

In a restructuring context, there are three priorities that dominate decision-making:

1) Liquidity and operational focus

When you’re stabilizing a complex retail group, every extra channel adds cost and distraction: integration work, merchandising alignment, inventory planning, customer service, returns, marketing, and analytics. If the channel isn’t producing meaningful incremental value, it becomes a liability.

2) Vendor confidence and supply continuity

Luxury retail runs on vendor trust. Brands need to believe they will be paid, that inventory will be protected, and that pricing discipline will be maintained. During turbulence, retailers often over-communicate stability and reduce anything that could be interpreted as loss of control.

3) Rebuilding traffic to owned channels

For a department-store model, margin survival increasingly depends on shifting customers to the highest-margin pathways: owned e-commerce, app, loyalty/member experiences, private clienteling, and events. If traffic is redirected to a third-party storefront, the retailer risks paying “rent” in the form of platform economics and reduced ability to build lifetime value.

Strategically, the move signals a pivot: simplify the ecosystem, concentrate on cash-generating operations, and rebuild the brand’s ability to drive full-price demand — without external dependencies that dilute identity.

What it tells us about the crisis of luxury retail

Luxury retail’s crisis is not one thing. It’s a stack of compounding pressures — many of them structural, not cyclical.

1) The “aspirational luxury” squeeze

The middle of the luxury market is under the most pressure. Ultra-high-end clients remain resilient, but aspirational customers (who used to stretch for a purchase) are more cautious. That shifts the category from “growth + pricing power” to “selective demand + promotional gravity.”

When that happens, the weakest part of the value chain gets exposed: multi-brand retailers carrying heavy fixed costs, with inventory risk, and limited ability to enforce full-price integrity across brands.

2) Inventory and markdown economics are redefining winners

Multi-brand retailers are essentially portfolio managers of inventory — and inventory volatility is brutal in slow demand cycles. Mis-forecasting turns into markdowns; markdowns train customers; trained customers wait; and the spiral worsens.

Off-price can help clear inventory, but it can also become a “shadow channel” that erodes full-price perception. The recent industry trend is telling: outlets and off-price are being reframed as liquidation tools, not growth engines.

3) Department stores are fighting a two-front war

They’re being squeezed by:

Brands going direct (DTC and brand-controlled e-commerce)
Platform economics (marketplaces and paid acquisition costs)

In other words, department stores are losing unique access to brands and losing cost advantage in customer acquisition at the same time.

4) Omnichannel has become expensive — and unforgiving

The promise of omnichannel was convenience. The hidden reality is cost: ship-from-store complexity, returns, reverse logistics, fraud, customer support, and inventory accuracy. In luxury, expectations are higher (packaging, speed, white-glove service), which pushes cost even further up.

When sales soften, those costs do not soften proportionally — and the model breaks faster than executives expect.

5) Luxury is redefining what “premium experience” means

Luxury used to be anchored in physical experience: flagship stores, personal shoppers, salons, events. Today, “premium” must also exist digitally:

Editorial storytelling that feels like a magazine, not a catalog
Clienteling that feels personal, not automated
Service recovery that is proactive, not policy-driven

That bar is difficult to hit on generalized platforms — and difficult for legacy retailers with fragmented tech stacks and tight budgets.

Who wins next: the models that are compounding advantages

The next cycle will reward luxury retail models that can combine:

Brand control (assortment, pricing integrity, narrative)
Client ownership (data, relationships, repeat behavior)
Operational discipline (inventory accuracy, returns control, cash efficiency)
Experience differentiation (service choreography, trust, exclusivity cues)

Three models are emerging as structurally advantaged:

Model A — Brand-controlled ecosystems (DTC + curated wholesale)

Brands that tightly manage distribution can protect pricing and invest in service experiences that build lifetime value. Wholesale becomes selective and strategic — supporting discovery and reach without surrendering governance.

Model B — Curated multi-brand platforms with strong governance

Multi-brand can still win — but only with strict discipline: authenticated supply chains, clear differentiation, and a “taste” proposition that brands respect. This model looks less like “infinite shelf” and more like “editorial curation + service excellence.”

Model C — High-touch physical retail as a relationship engine

Stores that function as clienteling hubs (appointments, styling, repairs, events) are less exposed to pure transaction volatility. The store becomes the relationship engine, and digital becomes the continuity layer.

Where does the Saks–Amazon experiment fit? It was trying to blend Model B and marketplace scale — but the governance burden, brand hesitation, and economics appear to have prevented it from compounding.

A practical playbook for luxury retailers and brands in 2026

If you’re leading strategy, digital, or merchandising in luxury retail right now, here are practical moves that map to what we’re seeing:

1) Choose fewer channels — and execute them exceptionally well

Channel sprawl is a silent killer. Every channel requires:

Assortment strategy
Inventory policy
Pricing governance
Service standards
Marketing investment

When resources are tight, “more channels” almost always means “more mediocrity.” The winning move is ruthless prioritization.

2) Treat trust as an operational KPI, not a marketing claim

Luxury trust is built through operational rigor:

Authentication and chain-of-custody discipline
Packaging standards
Returns/refunds speed and fairness
Proactive service recovery

If you can’t guarantee those consistently on a channel, don’t scale that channel.

3) Re-architect inventory around demand signals, not seasonal hope

Luxury retail is moving from “seasonal bulk bets” to “signal-driven replenishment.” This requires tighter integration between:

Merch planning
Digital demand analytics
Store-level sell-through visibility
Vendor collaboration

4) Make clienteling measurable

Clienteling can’t remain “art only.” It needs a measurable operating model:

Client book health (coverage, recency, segmentation)
Appointment-to-purchase conversion
Event ROI and retention lift
Repeat rate and category expansion

5) Turn off-price into a controlled release valve

Off-price should exist — but as a controlled release valve, not a parallel growth engine. The goal is to clear inventory without training your core client to wait for discounts.

6) Build partnership structures that preserve governance

Partnerships can still work — but the contract must be explicit about governance:

Brand presentation standards
Data rights and customer relationship rules
Pricing and promotion policies
Return policies and service SLAs

If those aren’t enforceable, the partnership becomes a brand liability.

Closing thought: luxury’s next cycle will be earned, not assumed

The end of the Saks–Amazon partnership is not a verdict on either company’s talent or ambition. It’s a reminder that luxury retail has become structurally harder:

Demand is more selective.
Customer acquisition is more expensive.
Omnichannel operations are costlier than spreadsheets suggest.
Brands are more protective of distribution than ever.

In that environment, experiments that add complexity without compounding trust and margin will be pruned quickly.

The question for 2026 is simple: will luxury retail be rebuilt around fewer, stronger, governed ecosystems — or will it keep chasing scale in environments that inherently dilute the luxury proposition?

I’ll continue to connect the dots as this restructuring evolves and as we see which luxury retail operating models are proving resilient.

Key takeaways (for skim readers)

Luxury doesn’t scale like commodity e-commerce. Governance and trust are the product.
Marketplaces create brand adjacency and pricing psychology risks that luxury brands resist.
In a restructuring cycle, focus wins. Channels that don’t drive meaningful incremental value get cut.
The winners will be governed ecosystems that combine client ownership, operational discipline, and experience differentiation.

Amazon’s 10% Corporate Cuts: A Retail Reset in an AI-Driven, Value-Hungry Market

Amazon’s announcement that it will cut roughly 10% of its corporate workforce is being read as yet another “tech layoff” headline. But the more useful lens is retail strategy. This is a signal that the world’s most influential commerce platform is tightening its operating model—fewer layers, faster decisions, harder prioritization—at the exact moment the retail industry is being squeezed by value-driven consumers, volatile costs, and a step-change in productivity enabled by AI.

What Amazon Announced (and What It Implies)

Amazon confirmed approximately 16,000 corporate job cuts—a reduction that represents close to 10% of its corporate workforce—as part of a broader effort to trim about 30,000 corporate roles since October. The company’s messaging emphasized classic operating-model themes: reducing layers, increasing ownership, and removing bureaucracy.

Importantly, this is not a warehousing/fulfillment workforce story. Amazon’s total headcount remains dominated by frontline operations. This is a white-collar reset: the structures that sit between strategy and execution—program management layers, duplicated planning cycles, slow approval chains, and teams attached to initiatives that no longer clear the bar.

In parallel, Reuters reported Amazon is also closing its remaining brick-and-mortar Fresh grocery stores and Go markets, and discontinuing Amazon One biometric palm payments—moves that reinforce the same narrative: prune bets that aren’t scaling, focus investment where the company can build defensible advantage, and simplify the portfolio.

Amazon’s workforce move is less about “panic” and more about a mature platform re-optimizing for speed, margin discipline, and AI-enabled productivity.

A note on “AI” vs “Culture” explanations

In corporate restructurings, “AI” and “culture” can both be true—yet incomplete. AI does not automatically eliminate jobs; it changes the unit economics of work. When tasks become faster and cheaper, management starts asking different questions:

How many coordination roles do we still need?
Which approvals can be automated or collapsed?
Which initiatives are producing measurable customer value—and which are internal theater?
Can one team now deliver what previously required three?

That is how AI becomes a restructuring force—indirectly, through higher expectations of throughput and sharper scrutiny of “organizational drag.”

Zoom Out: Retail in 2026 Is Growing… But It’s Not Getting Easier

The retail industry is living with a paradox: consumers are still spending, and online sales can hit records, yet many retailers feel structurally pressured. Why? Because growth is increasingly “bought” through discounts, logistics promises, and expensive digital experience upgrades—while costs remain stubborn.

One recent data point illustrates the dynamic: U.S. online holiday spending reached a record level even as growth slowed versus the prior year, supported by steep discounts and wider use of buy-now-pay-later. That combination is great for topline… and often less great for margin quality.

The “value-seeking consumer” is no longer a segment—it’s the default

Retailers have trained customers to expect promotions, fast delivery, frictionless returns, and real-time price comparison. Meanwhile, macro uncertainty (rates, trade policy, input costs) raises the cost of doing business. The result is a market where consumers behave rationally, and retailers have less room for error.

Deloitte’s 2026 retail outlook summarizes the strategic center of gravity well: retailers are converging on AI execution, customer experience re-design, supply chain resilience, and margin management/cost discipline as the core levers of competitiveness.

Why Amazon’s Cuts Matter for the Whole Retail Industry

Amazon’s decisions tend to become industry standards—not because others want to imitate Amazon, but because Amazon shifts customer expectations and competitive economics. A 10% corporate workforce reduction sends at least five signals to the retail market:

1) Overhead is back under the microscope

Many retailers expanded corporate functions during the pandemic-era acceleration—analytics, growth marketing, product, program management, experimentation teams. In 2026, boards and CEOs are asking: which of these functions are directly improving customer outcomes or margin? “Nice to have” roles are increasingly hard to defend when the same outcomes can be achieved through automation, consolidation, or simpler governance.

2) The new operating model is flatter, faster, and more measurable

Retail is becoming more like software in one key respect: the feedback loop is immediate. Pricing changes, conversion, fulfillment performance, churn—everything is instrumented. That makes slow decision cycles unacceptable. Organizations that require three meetings to approve what the customer experiences in three seconds will lose.

3) Portfolio pruning is becoming normal—even for big brands

Amazon closing remaining Fresh/Go stores and dropping Amazon One is a reminder that even massive companies abandon initiatives that don’t scale. Across retail, the era of “everything, everywhere” experiments is giving way to a tighter focus on what truly differentiates: loyalty ecosystems, private label, retail media, last-mile advantage, and data-driven assortment.

4) AI is reshaping cost structures—especially in corporate roles

AI is accelerating work in marketing ops, customer service knowledge management, basic software engineering, forecasting, and merchandising analytics. The real change is not the tool itself—it’s that management will recalibrate what “normal productivity” looks like. That inevitably reduces tolerance for duplicated roles and slow handoffs.

5) The definition of “resilience” has changed

Resilience used to mean having a big balance sheet and scale. Now it increasingly means: the ability to reallocate resources quickly, shut down underperforming bets without drama, and redirect investment into the handful of initiatives that move customer metrics and margin simultaneously.

The Retail Context: What’s Driving This Reset?

To understand why Amazon is tightening its corporate model, it helps to look at the pressure points shared across retail:

Promotion intensity: Customers anchor to discounts; winning volume can mean sacrificing margin quality.
Cost volatility: Transportation, labor, and trade-related inputs remain uncertain in many categories.
Omnichannel complexity: Serving “shop anywhere, return anywhere” is operationally expensive.
Inventory risk: Too much inventory forces markdowns; too little risks losing customers to substitutes.
Experience arms race: Faster delivery, better search, better personalization, smoother returns—costs money, but is now table stakes.
Retail media monetization: A growing lever, but it demands sophisticated data governance and measurement discipline.

Against that backdrop, corporate structures that were tolerable in a growth-at-all-costs environment are being questioned. The industry is moving from “more initiatives” to “fewer initiatives executed extremely well.”

What about physical retail?

Physical retail isn’t “dead”; it’s polarizing. Best-in-class operators are using stores as fulfillment nodes, experience hubs, and loyalty engines. But undifferentiated footprints—especially those without a clear convenience or experience edge—are hard to justify when consumers can compare prices instantly and demand fast delivery.

Amazon’s pullback from certain physical formats reinforces this: physical retail can be powerful, but only when the model is scalable and operationally repeatable. Otherwise, it becomes an expensive distraction.

A Balanced View: Efficiency Gains vs Human Cost

It’s easy to discuss layoffs as if they are purely strategic chess moves. They are not. They impact real people, families, and local economies—and they can damage trust inside the company if handled poorly.

From a leadership standpoint, Amazon’s challenge is not just to reduce cost. It must also preserve the talent density required for innovation—especially in areas like cloud, AI, and customer experience—while preventing the organization from becoming risk-averse after cuts.

For employees and the broader labor market, these announcements reinforce an uncomfortable reality: corporate work is being re-benchmarked. Roles that exist primarily to coordinate, summarize, or route decisions are most exposed—because AI can increasingly compress those activities.

The strategic question isn’t whether AI “replaces” people—it’s how organizations redesign work so that humans focus on judgment, customer insight, and differentiated creation.

What Retail Leaders Should Take Away (Practical Lessons)

If you are a retail executive, Amazon’s move is not a template—but it is a forcing function. Here are concrete, board-ready takeaways:

Lesson 1: Cut complexity before you cut ambition

Many retailers respond to pressure by cutting budgets across the board. A better approach is to cut complexity: reduce layers, simplify decision rights, and collapse duplicated teams—so that investment can remain focused on the few initiatives that matter.

Lesson 2: Make AI a productivity program, not a pilot

Retailers who treat AI as a lab experiment will underperform. The winning pattern is to tie AI directly to measurable outcomes: lower cost-to-serve, improved forecast accuracy, reduced customer contact rates, faster cycle times in merchandising, and better conversion.

Lesson 3: Rebuild metrics around margin quality, not just topline

In a discount-driven market, revenue can be misleading. Track contribution margin by channel, return-adjusted profitability, fulfillment cost per order, and promotion ROI. Growth that destroys margin is not strategy—it’s drift.

Lesson 4: Align the operating model to the customer journey

Most friction (and cost) comes from handoffs between teams that own fragments of the journey. A customer-centric model is not a slogan—it’s a design principle: fewer handoffs, clearer ownership, faster iteration.

Lesson 5: Treat restructuring as a credibility moment

Trust is an asset. How you communicate, how you support transitions, and how you explain priorities determines whether you retain top performers—or lose them to competitors at the worst time.

What Happens Next: 3 Scenarios to Watch

Over the next two quarters, three scenarios are worth monitoring across retail and e-commerce:

Scenario A — “Efficiency flywheel”: AI-driven productivity offsets cost pressures, and retailers reinvest savings into experience and loyalty, strengthening competitive moats.
Scenario B — “Promotion trap”: Demand stays healthy, but competitors chase share with discounts, compressing margins and forcing continued cost cuts.
Scenario C — “Selective resilience”: Leaders with strong private label, retail media, and supply chain agility outperform; mid-tier players get squeezed between price leaders and premium experience brands.

Amazon’s corporate cuts are consistent with Scenario A: compress overhead, increase speed, and keep optionality for reinvestment in priority bets. But the industry will not move uniformly—expect divergence.

Closing Thought

Amazon’s decision is not a prediction of collapsing demand. It is a prediction of a different competitive game: retail in 2026 rewards speed, cost discipline, and AI-enabled execution more than headcount and organizational breadth.

The retailers that win won’t just “use AI.” They’ll redesign their operating models so that AI compresses cycle times, eliminates coordination drag, and frees talent to focus on what customers actually feel—price, convenience, trust, and relevance.

FAQ

Is Amazon cutting warehouse and fulfillment jobs?

The announced reduction is primarily focused on corporate roles. Amazon’s overall workforce is largely frontline operations; the corporate cuts represent a much smaller share of total headcount.

Does this mean retail demand is weakening?

Not necessarily. The better interpretation is that retailers are re-optimizing for a market where consumers remain value-driven and operational costs remain pressured. This is about competitiveness and margin structure as much as demand.

Will other retailers follow?

Many already are. Corporate overhead, decision layers, and duplicated functions are being scrutinized across the industry—especially where AI can compress workflows and increase measurable productivity.

France has many famous business dynasties. Few inspire as much admiration, suspicion, and outright jealousy as the Mulliez family.

They built and co-own a constellation of household brands—Decathlon, Leroy Merlin, Auchan, Kiabi, Boulanger, Electro Dépôt, and many more. Yet their model remains intentionally discreet, structured around a family association rather than a single “group,” and powered by internal capital recycling across dozens of operating companies.

In a country where debates about “capitalisme héréditaire” and fairness are constant, the Mulliez ecosystem sits at the center of a paradox: it has created jobs, consumer value, and international champions—while simultaneously becoming a lightning rod for criticism when restructuring hits, dividends rise, or the family’s opacity meets public expectations of transparency.

This article takes a balanced, business-first look at (1) what made the Mulliez model successful, (2) what is currently stressing it, and (3) why the combination of success + discretion + capital concentration so often translates into jealousy—especially in the French context.

1) The Mulliez “galaxy”: not one company, but an ownership system

A key point is structural: the Mulliez are not a classic listed conglomerate. Their ecosystem is held together through the Association Familiale Mulliez (AFM), which groups together members of the family and organizes shared ownership across many businesses.

According to reporting in Le Monde, the AFM includes 950 members and spans around 130 companies, employing more than 620,000 people worldwide, including ~175,000 in France. The same source notes that this scale would make it the largest private employer in France—if it were recognized as a single group.

That “if” matters. Because the Mulliez model rejects the label of a centralized group, preferring a federation of businesses tied by common shareholders—while unions have pushed to have AFM treated as a group to facilitate redeployment obligations during layoffs and restructuring.

Why this matters strategically: the AFM structure is not an administrative detail. It is the core of their competitive advantage… and the core of the controversy when cycles turn.

2) What made the model work: a capital + entrepreneurship flywheel

2.1 A long-term ownership mindset (with a founder logic)

The origin story (as described in the same reporting) is classic “family capitalism”: Louis Mulliez encouraged his children to create and invest in new ventures, meet regularly to share experience, and become shareholders in one another’s businesses—creating a culture of internal entrepreneurship + mutual ownership.

In practical terms, that translates into:

Patient capital: no quarterly earnings pressure from public markets.
Compounding know-how: retail operations, real estate, logistics, merchandising, pricing, and store execution are learned and reused across banners.
Repeatable venture creation: a playbook for launching, scaling, and sometimes shutting down formats.

2.2 The “cash cow rotation” mechanism

The family’s success is not only about picking winners—it is about rotating the cash cow. Historically, one strong business financed the next wave of growth elsewhere.

Le Monde describes how Phildar (yarns) served as a “bas de laine” (cash reserve) for early expansion; then Auchan became a “mère nourricière” supporting Decathlon, Leroy Merlin, Flunch and others.

That model has a brutal elegance:

When a banner matures, it generates cash.
Cash is redistributed (dividends) and reinvested into other businesses or turnarounds.
New banners grow into the next generation of cash engines.

More recently, the same reporting notes that Auchan France represents only ~5% of AFM value, while Adeo (Leroy Merlin and related banners) and Decathlon have become the heavyweights sustaining the system.

2.3 A culture of operational autonomy (“initiative to the field”)

Another differentiator is cultural: decentralization and “store-first” autonomy. AFM leadership argues that empowering teams locally helped them respond quickly during the COVID shock and even gain share versus Amazon in some categories.

Whether one fully buys the claim or not, the underlying management philosophy is consistent: execution at scale, with strong internal promotion and deep retail craft.

3) Why the model is under pressure now: retail physics changed

If the Mulliez story were only about success, nobody would be talking about it this intensely today. The reason it has re-entered public debate is that several prominent banners are facing structural headwinds—and the old playbook is being stress-tested.

3.1 The “overexposure to physical retail” problem

The AFM portfolio is heavily concentrated in physical retail formats—hypermarkets, specialty retail, home improvement, sporting goods, apparel, furniture. That was a superpower during the decades of “hyperconsumption.” It is a vulnerability in a world shaped by:

E-commerce scale and platform economics
Fast-fashion and ultra-low-cost entrants
Customer acquisition shifting to digital
Rising operating costs and real estate constraints

The article explicitly references competitive pressure from players such as Amazon, Shein and Temu, and the “decommercialisation” trend impacting roundabouts and city centers.

3.2 High-profile difficulties: Auchan, Alinea, Foundever

Recent headlines have amplified the perception of fragility:

Auchan announced plans to transfer nearly 300 French supermarkets under Intermarché/Netto banners—interpreted as an admission of failure after years of losses and market-share erosion, with hypermarket uncertainty still looming.
Alinea entered judicial reorganization again, threatening around 1,200 jobs.
Foundever (ex-Sitel), employing ~150,000 globally, faced a debt restructuring process in the U.S., described as heavy “surgery.”

These situations are not identical—but they converge into one reputational effect: when a “discreet empire” hits turbulence, the public narrative quickly becomes moralized.

3.3 Governance tradeoffs: loyalty vs turnaround speed

Le Monde also highlights a recurring critique from observers: the family may excel at conquest but struggle in crisis, relying heavily on internally promoted leaders and maintaining confidence “against all odds” longer than outsiders would.

From a transformation perspective, this is a classic governance dilemma:

Internal promotion preserves culture, craft, and loyalty.
External turnaround talent can accelerate painful decisions and new capabilities.
But mixing the two requires a governance maturity that many family systems resist until a crisis forces the issue.

4) So why the jealousy? Four drivers that are uniquely “French”

Jealousy is rarely about the facts alone. It is about what people believe those facts represent—fairness, legitimacy, symbolism, and power.

4.1 The visibility gap: “big enough to shape lives, discreet enough to avoid scrutiny”

The Mulliez are frequently described as living by “pour vivre heureux, vivons cachés.”

That discretion is rational from a family-risk standpoint. But it has a cost: in the public eye, discretion often reads as avoidance—especially when restructuring impacts thousands of employees.

In other words: when you employ massive workforces and shape entire local economies, people expect a level of transparency similar to listed groups, even if the legal structure is different.

4.2 Capital concentration + inheritance in a country sensitive to inequality

France has a long-running cultural tension with hereditary wealth. The Mulliez model is, by design, a mechanism to preserve and compound family capital across generations. Even if it creates economic value, it triggers the perception of an “unfair starting line.”

That perception intensifies when contrasted with ordinary household constraints: wages, taxes, inflation, housing costs. The psychological math is simple: “they win even when the rest of us struggle.”

4.3 Dividends, wages, and the optics of redistribution

Nothing inflames jealousy like a number. Le Monde notes union criticism at Decathlon regarding €1B in dividends (compared with €787M net profit in 2024), while also noting that part of the dividends benefited 60,000 employee shareholders and that AFM injected €400M (2024) and €600M (2025) into Auchan.

From a finance standpoint, this can be framed as internal capital allocation and mutual support. From a public standpoint, it can be framed as “cash out to owners while stores cut costs.” Both framings can be partially true depending on what lens you use.

4.4 The “group or not a group?” tension in social expectations

When unions argue the AFM should be treated as a single group to enable redeployments between sister companies, they are making a broader point: if capital is shared, then social responsibility should be shared too.

This is a deep French expectation: large economic actors are expected to behave as “institutions,” not merely collections of private assets. The AFM model challenges that expectation—and that creates friction.

5) A fairer assessment: why this isn’t just “rich family = bad”

It is easy—especially in polarized narratives—to turn the Mulliez story into a morality play. A more rigorous view recognizes tradeoffs.

5.1 They created real consumer value at scale

Decathlon democratized access to sport. Leroy Merlin and Adeo built household renovation capabilities and accessible DIY distribution. Kiabi pushed affordable family apparel. These aren’t abstract financial constructs: they are practical value propositions used daily by millions.

5.2 They built jobs—and a management pipeline

Retail is often dismissed, yet it remains one of the largest employment engines. The AFM system is also a talent factory: store leadership, logistics, procurement, category management, omnichannel operations. That operational discipline is rare and transferable.

5.3 They accept “creative destruction” internally

The same reporting highlights a Schumpeterian “creation-destruction” process: some formats fail (Pic Pain, Surcouf, etc.), some recover after long struggles, and cash cows rotate.

In plain terms: they don’t pretend every bet will work. They keep funding the system until something else wins.

6) The strategic lesson: the model must evolve (without losing its edge)

The real question is not whether the Mulliez family “deserves” its success. The question is whether a retail-centered ownership system can remain dominant under new market physics.

6.1 Data and ecosystem moves: Valiuz as a signal

One of the most telling evolutions is the move to share customer data across banners to compete on advertising targeting and platform capabilities—formalized via Valiuz (officialized in 2019), after difficult internal negotiations.

This is strategically coherent: retail margins are under pressure; monetizing data, media, and ecosystem services becomes a defensive and offensive lever—if executed well.

6.2 The next governance challenge: the fifth generation

Le Monde notes periodic introspection exercises about where the family wants to be in 20 years, and flags the arrival of the fifth generation as a key upcoming challenge.

Family systems become harder—not easier—over time: more shareholders, more branches, more divergent views on risk, tech, liquidity, and social responsibility. Sustaining performance requires stronger governance, not just stronger operators.

Conclusion: admiration and jealousy can be two sides of the same coin

The Mulliez ecosystem is a case study in how to build durable economic power: patient capital, decentralized entrepreneurship, operational excellence, and internal reallocation of cash between banners.

But the same ingredients also generate backlash in France: discretion collides with social expectations; dividends collide with wage debates; “not a group” collides with workforce redeployment demands; inherited ownership collides with cultural sensitivity to inequality.

In the end, the jealousy is not only about wealth. It’s about perceived legitimacy—and legitimacy is earned not just by performance, but by transparency, social reciprocity, and the ability to show that success scales benefits beyond shareholders.

Question for leaders and policymakers: As retail transforms and restructurings continue, should systems like AFM be encouraged as long-term value builders—or regulated as de facto groups with broader obligations? The answer will define not only the Mulliez trajectory, but the future shape of French capitalism.